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Enrolling the private sector in community development: Magic bullet or sleight 
of hand? 
                                                                                
ABSTRACT 
The role of the private sector in international development is growing, supported by 
new and evolving official programmes, financing, partnerships and narratives. This 
paper examines the place of the private sector in ‘community development’ in the 
global South. It situates Corporate Community Development (CCD) conceptually in 
long-standing debates within critical development studies to consider the distinct roles 
that corporations are playing and how they are responding to the challenges and 
contradictions entailed within ‘community development’. Drawing on field-based 
research across three different contexts and sectors for CCD in Fiji, Papua New 
Guinea and South Africa, the paper suggests that caution is required in assuming that 
corporations can succeed where governments, NGOs and international development 
organisations have so often met with complex challenges and intractable difficulties. 
We argue that four specific problems confront CCD: (a) the problematic ways in 
which ‘communities’ are defined, delineated and constructed; (b) the disconnected 
nature of many CCD initiatives, and lack of alignment and integration with local and 
national development planning policies and processes; (c) top down governance, and 
the absence or erosion of participatory processes and empowerment objectives; (d) the 
tendency towards highly conservative development visions. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The role of the private sector as an ‘active partner’ in international development is 
growing, supported by new and evolving official programmes, financing, partnerships 
and narratives (Kindornay and Reilly King, 2013; Blowfield and Dolan, 2014). This 
paper examines the place of the private sector – more particularly, global corporations 
– in ‘community development’, a specific form of development intervention in the 
global South. As with many other aspects of private sector-led development, 
Corporate Community Development (CCD), defined as company activities directed 
deliberately at supporting community development (Banks et al., forthcoming), is not 
a new phenomenon. However, it is currently contextualised within a rapidly 
deepening normative discourse that positions the private sector as an active 
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development agent. There is a rich existing literature on corporate involvement in 
community development, located primarily in explorations of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR), which analyses a range of sectors, rationales, contexts and 
outcomes of CCD (e.g. Banks et al., 2013; Gardner et al., 2012; Rajak, 2010). 
Corporations are engaging with community-led development initiatives in a wide 
variety of contexts and ways, and with different motivations and goals (sometimes 
within different operational sections and levels of the same company). In some cases, 
these initiatives are a result of legal obligations written into tenders, contracts and 
agreements; in other cases they are a result of donor-led partnerships and 
programmes; elsewhere they reflect a ‘voluntary’ decision by a firm with motivations 
arising from a range of contexts and objectives. 
This paper makes three contributions. First, we situate CCD conceptually in 
long-standing debates within critical development studies to consider the distinct roles 
that corporations are playing and how they are responding to the widely identified 
challenges and contradictions entailed in ‘community development’. Second, our 
analysis draws on field-based research across three different contexts and sectors for 
CCD in Fiji, Papua New Guinea and South Africa. This enables us to offer broader 
resolution observations on the wider phenomenon, which emerge from ground level 
analysis. Finally, we locate CCD within the currently changing official development 
regime, in which the private sector is being radically re-centred as the engine of 
development (Merino and Valor, 2011; Mawdsley, 2014). Drawing on our three 
examples, we examine to what extent corporations are an appropriate stakeholder to 
be charged with delivering community development.  
While there is no single definition of community development, a review of 
UN bodies, donors and NGOs reveals that the distinctive feature of this mode of 
development is some meaningful degree of community agency. For example, the UN 
defines community development as ‘a process where community members come 
together to take collective action and generate solutions to common problems’ (in 
Frank and Smith, 1999: 10). Other organizations are more radical in treating agency 
as a means to contest structural inequalities of power, with community development 
comprising development initiatives and relationships that go beyond the ad hoc 
transfer of benefits, transform local power relationships and include historically 
disadvantaged people to achieve bottom-up empowerment and change. It is important, 
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therefore, to examine the extent to which private sector corporations align with more 
radical notions relating to power relations and if the current faith invested by many 
governments and international organisations (Blowfield and Dolan, 2014) in the 
ability of multinational corporations to deliver development outcomes through 
community development is warranted. 
Our intention is to initiate this debate by drawing on evidence from three 
specific and diverse examples of CCD. Our three examples capture the different ways 
in which private sector organisations are engaging with CCD: at one extreme through 
the enrolment of private sector businesses into CCD by government policy that 
determines the nature and extent of their required investments into local communities; 
at the other extreme through CCD projects that are effectively initiated and controlled 
entirely by private sector organisations despite or in the absence of government 
requirements; or through a combination of these modes in which government requires 
a commitment to CCD for investment to go ahead, but grants autonomy to private 
sector organisations to determine the nature and extent of their commitment. The first 
example – a renewable energy procurement programme in South Africa that began in 
2011 – is a case in which the private sector is being enrolled in community 
development by the state. Our discussion draws on research conducted between 2012 
and 2014, including six weeks of fieldwork in the Northern and Western Cape 
provinces, interviews with key informants including government officials, private 
sector stakeholders and individual off-grid energy consumers, and document analysis 
of government policies, press releases, and reports on the renewable energy roll-out 
(see McEwan, in review).  The second example – CCD in Papua New Guinean 
communities affected by large-scale mining operations – is a case in which CCD is 
driven by the private sector. Our arguments are informed by over 20 years of research 
and consultancy on communities and large-scale mining in the Pacific, and draw 
specifically on comparative fieldwork in Papua New Guinea in 2010-11 on corporate 
and donor approaches to community development involving interviews with corporate 
staff, government officers and community members around four large-scale mines 
(see Banks et al. 2013). The third example – community engagement by tourist 
corporations in Fiji – is a case in which legal and policy instruments create the context 
for CCD, but in which individual corporations determine the nature and extent of their 
CCD activities. This case is informed by research conducted in 2009-10, including 
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interviews with two tour operators and managers of 10 tourism accommodation 
businesses, members of landowning communities and other stakeholders from the 
tourism industry, NGOs, and government ministries (see Scheyvens and Russell 
2012).
1
 Drawing from these examples, we are interested in whether or not 
corporations are likely to remedy, replicate or exacerbate some of the problems 
identified in critiques directed at state, NGO and donor involvement in community 
development. 
Our comparison of these seemingly quite incommensurate examples is held 
together by three factors. First, our research in each context shares a common 
methodology based in extensive field research, primarily interviews with diverse 
stakeholder groups, including corporate actors and community members directly 
affected by CCD. Second, irrespective of the different levels of state involvement in 
setting legal parameters for CCD in each case, private sector organisations operating 
in different economic sectors in the global South face a number of shared pressures. 
These include: being seen to mitigate against detrimental impacts of the development 
on local communities, which might include commitments to environmental 
stewardship and/or sustainable development (Baver and Lynch 2006); appearing to 
distribute some of the benefits of the development to affected communities through 
CCD to mitigate against charges of unfair exploitation of natural resources, economic 
injustice and the creation of privatised spaces of exclusion (e.g. tourist resorts, mine 
compounds, wind and solar farms); underpinning these pressures is a further pressure 
to protect corporate image, both to retain shareholder confidence and to protect assets 
against potential local resistance. Finally, we suggest that while there might be 
different modes of engagement in each context, agency in the shift towards private 
sector-led development lies primarily with businesses, who also exercise considerable 
power and influence in determining the nature and outcomes of CCD in specific 
localities.  
Although our examples are not representative of the entirety of corporate 
involvement in community development in the global South, they point to some 
significant trends and raise some similar or related challenges and problems. Four 
                                                          
1 Scheyvens and Banks also lead a research project (2013-16) that is examining CCD in Fiji and Papua 
New Guinea, including intensive examination of two multinational mining companies and two 
multinational tourism companies and their relationships with nearby communities. 
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overlapping themes emerge from our analysis that suggest, at the very least, caution is 
required in assuming that corporations can succeed where governments, NGOs and 
international development organisations have so often met with complex challenges 
and intractable difficulties. These are: (a) the problematic ways in which 
‘communities’ are defined, delineated and constructed; (b) the disconnected nature of 
many CCD initiatives, and lack of alignment and integration with local and national 
development planning policies and processes; (c) top down governance, and the 
absence or erosion of participatory processes and empowerment objectives; (d) the 
tendency towards highly conservative development visions in private sector activities. 
While we certainly identify examples of better practice (see below), overall we find 
little evidence that CCD reflects a radical commitment to more transformational 
understandings of community development. We develop these arguments 
subsequently, following a brief discussion of how the private sector is currently being 
(re-)positioned and/or (re-)positioning itself within international development. 
 
THE PRIVATE SECTOR AS A DEVELOPMENT AGENT 
The private sector has always been an object, partner and agent of international 
development in both its ‘intentional’ (Development) and ‘immanent’ (development) 
forms (Cowen and Shenton, 1996). Beyond the shared goal of profit seeking, the 
private sector is, of course, highly diverse. It includes formal and informal 
organisations, ranges from financial services and the commerce of goods and services 
to mining and agriculture, and ranges in scale from one-person enterprises to vast 
transnational conglomerates. Moreover, these different private sector scales, 
networks, forms and functions are embedded in and across specific economies, 
polities and cultures, which shape their roles and relationships. However, a distinct 
private sector-led model of development has emerged in recent years. Corporations 
have played a role in pressing hard for this shift, not least because it allows them to 
impose business values as non-negotiable (e.g. the right to make a profit; the right to 
own and exploit land and resources) and to address only what business is prepared to 
accept as negotiable, as well as enabling them to regulate ‘social’ standards and to 
gain ground vis-à-vis the state and civil society (Blowfield 2005; Jenkins 2005; 
O’Laughlin 2008).  However, a more recent factor in this shift has been the 
increasingly explicit turn of many of the so-called ‘traditional’ donors (multilateral 
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and bilateral, state and non-state), towards the private sector as the engine of 
development. While donors have always had a variety of (sometimes very close) 
relations with private sector agendas and actors, in the last decade or so these have 
become much more strongly institutionalised and narratively centred within 
mainstream development. 
Donors and development partners have historically engaged with the private 
sector in/for development. However, as a Eurodad (2013) report suggests, we are 
currently witnessing a much stronger and changing narrative around the role of the 
private sector for economic growth/development; this is translating into publicly-
backed lending to ‘leverage’ private sector resources, new and expanding financing 
for private sector partnerships, new programmes and priorities, and new institutional 
structures, personnel and mandates within development agencies. The UNDP 
(2012:10), for example, advances a number of reasons why it should work more 
closely with the private sector, including viewing it as ‘the main driver of economic 
growth’, an innovator of ‘new technologies’ and a driver of ‘social investment and 
philanthropic resources toward development’. While it is keen to address institutional 
and capacity issues to improve its role regarding engagement (ibid.: 7-8), it ignores 
the possibility that the private sector’s developmental role might be limited by or in 
tension with its profit-focused raison d’être. Other donors are focused similarly on 
creating an enabling environment for drawing the private sector into development 
roles, seemingly without critical reflection on whether and how the interests of 
different groups might align or depart (Mawdsley 2015). 
A substantial critical commentary is emerging from academics and NGOs on 
the lack of a conceptual connection between ‘growth’ and ‘development’ evident in 
the current wave of programmes and policies supporting (mostly donor) private sector 
firms to invest in ‘developing’ countries. The vast majority, if not all, of these critical 
commentators recognise the value and role of a well-functioning private sector in 
providing jobs, growth, and a healthy society as well as economy. However, evidence 
is mounting that the enthusiastic turn to ‘private sector-led development’ is riddled 
with unresolved contradictions and blind spots (Kindornay and Reilly-King, 2013; 
Tomlinson 2012). Despite this, the private sector is being placed at the heart of a re-
emerging insistence on economic growth as the central engine of development (Davis 
2012: 427-8). A number of development agencies are looking increasingly at Public-
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Private Partnerships (PPPs) as means of providing financial and technical support to 
stimulate economic activity and investment (Pedersen and Huniche, 2006). Within the 
current more enabling environment, global corporations are also beginning to see (or 
seeking to represent) themselves as agents of development, at least in the countries 
and communities in which they operate. Some of the leading mining companies, for 
example, have a stated focus on poverty reduction and human development at the 
level of policy, report against headline development indicators, such as the 
Millennium Development Goals, and allocate a proportion of pre-tax profit to 
community programmes (Kemp, 2009).  
 Di Bella et al. (2013) offer a valuable framework for elucidating the different 
ways in which this variegated private sector is currently being positioned within 
international development. They suggest a three-fold typology. First, the private 
sector in development refers to the roles of and activities carried out by corporations 
as part of their regular core business operations that affect development outcomes and 
economic growth. This can have both positive impacts such as job creation, provision 
of goods and services, and taxation, and negative impacts such as environmental 
degradation and poor labour practices. Second, private sector development refers to 
activities carried out by governments and development organizations geared toward 
creating an enabling environment for business to flourish. This includes activities by 
development cooperation actors aimed at increasing private sector investment in 
developing countries. Third, private sector engagements for development go beyond 
the traditional impacts of the private sector in development to include firms’ active 
pursuit of positive development outcomes (di Bella et al., 2013: 2). Blowfield and 
Dolan (2014: 23-26) frame this slightly differently, but also contrast the private sector 
as a development tool (contributing to ‘immanent development’ simply by operating 
in developing countries), with the private sector as a development agent (purposefully 
acting to bring benefits through ‘intentional development’). None of these categories 
are mutually exclusive; in different ways, various facets and drivers of CSR, for 
example, could fit into any category.  
 This paper is concerned with the last of these categories: that is, corporations 
specifically being contracted or choosing to conduct community development. Firms 
may engage with community development independently, or in formal partnerships 
with domestic states and/or NGOs and donor agencies. The latter may be on a 
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voluntary basis (initiated by the firm itself for its own reasons, as with much of the 
CCD originating from mining corporations in Papua New Guinea), or driven by an 
official regulatory requirement for some form of community development action as 
part of the private sector’s functioning (as in the case of South Africa’s renewable 
energy procurement programme and, to some extent, tourism businesses in Fiji). As 
many national development agencies are re-tuned to bring in more private sector 
partners there are indications that corporations are being increasingly asked to work 
with ‘communities’ to promote various forms of economic and social development, 
although ‘community development’ itself appears to be rarely invoked directly (e.g. 
DFID, 2014). Today, as in the past, we see a concentration of private sector-led 
community development in particular sectors and often in geographically marginal 
areas, in some cases where the state’s presence and capacity is limited. Mining and 
the resource/extractive industries more broadly are one such sector, and tourism in 
particular contexts and places is another. As discussed in more detail below, this has a 
bearing on the specific rationales and challenges of private sector-led community 
development. 
 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
The notion of working with, for and through local communities in the global South is 
as old, varied and contested as intentional development itself, and the concept of 
‘community development’ has been claimed by both reactionary and radical causes 
and visions. On the one hand, community development dates back to colonial 
programmes in Africa that began around the 1920s (Smyth, 2004; Page, 2014). These 
were often explicit attempts to offset the social discontent caused by the dislocations 
of colonial economic development (Cowen and Shenton, 1996). As discussed below, 
this reactionary or ameliorating goal is still a major incentive for many companies 
seeking to dampen or deflect local anger at damaging social, economic and 
environmental impacts, notably by extractive industries (Banks et al., 2013; 
Gilberthorpe and Banks, 2012). On the other hand, radical theorists and activists have 
also long engaged with the idea of community development, although from very 
different standpoints and with different aspirations (Ledwith, 2011). Freire’s critical 
pedagogy (1970), for example, offers a more challenging vision of the means and 
goals of community development. Here the aim is to educate, politicise and empower 
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communities to better enable them, through collective action, to articulate, demand 
and achieve their own development visions and goals. While this might sometimes 
work within national visions and policies for political, social and economic 
improvement, awareness-raising and politicisation might also challenge powerful 
actors, elites and/or dominant development visions.  
The idea of working with and for communities flourished in development 
debates in the 1970s as reformists inside the development establishment pressed for 
development with a more human face. Ideas concerning bottom-up, empowering 
development encouraged planners to re-focus attention on the poor and 
disenfranchised, and to find ways of working to facilitate active participation of 
communities in development processes (Desai, 2008; Schumacher, 1973). In the 
1980s and 1990s, community-led development appealed both to progressives, who 
wanted to empower and harness the agency of the poor and marginalised (Chambers, 
1983), and also to more reactionary forces, who saw in it a means of reducing state 
obligations by creating a more ‘active’, ‘self-reliant’ or ‘responsible’ citizenry 
(Hickey and Mohan, 2000). One way of viewing this divide is between those who see 
community development primarily as a process (of empowerment) and those who see 
it as an instrumental tool (to achieve outcomes, such as improved maternal health, 
greater market access, and so forth). As noted previously, there are a variety of 
current definitions and usages within the international development community, but 
most cohere with the UN’s broad framing of community development as, ‘a process 
where community members come together to take collective action and generate 
solutions to common problems’.2 Others go beyond this to more explicitly relate it to 
transformational change, seeing in community development the contestation of 
historic and structural marginalisation. 
 The concept and practices of community development have been subject to 
considerable critical analysis. The term ‘community’ is inevitably a construct and 
open to considerable malleability in interpretation. Critical scholars of development 
have provided rich accounts of the ways in which the development industry has 
struggled with (and sometimes abused) the concept of ‘community’, for example, 
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http://unterm.un.org/DGAACS/unterm.nsf/8fa942046ff7601c85256983007ca4d8/526c2eaba978f00785
2569fd00036819?OpenDocument. Retrieved 3 January 2015. 
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deploying the term euphemistically to suggest simple, largely homogenous groupings 
(Gujit and Kaul Shah, 1998). Often related to a weak conceptual framing of 
‘community’ is an ambitious set of expectations of how change can be effected 
(Mansuri and Rao 2004). A review of critical development literature reveals three 
related sets of problems associated with community development programmes run by 
the state and/or various forms of civil society organisations (often NGOs in formal 
projects). The first centres on the inherent difficulties of drawing geographical or 
social boundaries around a ‘community’, and thus circumscribing the agents and/or 
beneficiaries of a particular project or intervention (e.g. Adams and Infield, 2003). 
The second is the difficulty of ensuring that within these boundaries, the complex and 
differentiated needs and views of different community members (for example, 
women, the elderly, the landless and so forth) are represented and voiced, while also 
ensuring that dominant groups do not capture the agenda and/or benefits (Chambers, 
1983). The third problem concerns the way in which community development relates 
(or not) to a broader agenda of systemic change. Where it is simply used to distract, 
depoliticise or erode state commitments to more progressive structural changes, then 
whatever the local achievements of ‘community development’, it does not contribute 
to longer-term, sustainable or just change (Ferguson 1994).  
 To date, evaluations of community development have tended to focus on 
‘traditional’ development actors who have for the most part funded, led and/or sought 
to facilitate these projects. They include national and local government agencies, 
international donors, and various local and transnational NGOs. However, as the 
private sector is increasingly validated and sought as an active development partner, it 
appears that corporations are being asked to play a larger role in different forms and 
expressions of community development. As the preceding discussion makes clear, this 
is not an entirely new phenomenon, but it looks likely to grow (see, for example, the 
recently published Swiss Development Agency (2011) guidelines for ‘Community-
Based Public Private Partnerships’).  
 Kapelus (2002) suggests that corporations deal with community development 
for different reasons, and with different tools, and different goals. Based on a close 
study of Rio Tinto’s CSR programmes, he argues that many corporations seek to 
offset proximate and more distant criticisms and resistance from a range of 
actors/stakeholders through recourse to community development programmes. 
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Muthuri et al. (2012) make similar points about the need to enhance corporate 
reputations, and to increase goodwill and legitimacy within local communities 
(securing a ‘social licence to operate’), by providing a range of initiatives in health 
care, education, economic welfare, infrastructure development, communication and 
environmental protection. Such interventions are increasingly sophisticated operations 
(Kapelus, 2002), and they certainly go beyond traditional philanthropy to incorporate 
more engaged activities in the political, social and economic life of the community 
(Muthuri et al., 2012). However, as Harvey (2013) suggests, there are limits to the 
sophisticated initiatives referred to above and corporations may need to look 
internally first so as to promote trust and cultural awareness. Keeping in mind that 
corporate managers typically have business and/or technical backgrounds, different 
management styles will undoubtedly influence attitudes to and relations with those 
living in adjacent communities. There are also tensions between the realities of 
working in/with local communities and corporate headquarter statements on the 
synergies between profit making, daily operations, and community development 
(Welker, 2014). In the case of Rio Tinto, Kapelus (2002) notes that the assumption of 
a harmony of interests between its business strategy and moral obligations leaves a 
number of unresolved conflicts, such as that between maximising shareholder value 
and the social, environmental and labour interests of local communities. Other critics 
(e.g. Asia-Pacific Human Rights Network, 2001) argue that Rio Tinto’s use of its 
community development initiatives for ‘public diplomacy’ is a facade that obscures 
its poor record on labour terms and conditions in developing countries.  
This points to broader critiques of CCD as a form of intentional development 
that is required to mitigate the negative consequences of immanent development, a 
Polanyian ‘double movement’ in which the commodification of resources and 
environments produces a counter movement to deal with its own egregious effects. 
Significantly, the first movement (the commodification of resources/environments) 
becomes the driver of the second, determining the nature of the governance of 
consequences (Bebbington and Bury, 2013). Thus, as numerous critics (e.g. Banks et 
al., 2013; Bebbington et al., 2008) have argued, community development responses 
are conservative forms of social technology and paternalistic forms of trusteeship that 
remain wilfully detached from political processes within communities. They are part 
of what Ferguson (1994) refers to as the anti-politics machine at work within 
13 
 
development. Essentially corporate programmes for community development reshape 
local meanings of development by creating an emphasis on specific forms and types 
of socially uneven development (Bebbington, 2010). 
Existing studies provide essential insights into private sector-led community 
development, but most tend to be concerned with one particular site, firm or sector. In 
contrast, this paper draws together primary research data and secondary literature 
analysis from across a range of contexts. As discussed, critiques of traditional forms 
of community development have highlighted problems with defining ‘community’, 
maintaining inclusiveness and equity within community development, and 
disconnection of community-based initiatives from systemic change. In what follows, 
we argue that applying a critical development studies perspective to an analysis of 
different private sector initiatives reveals that corporations are not immune from 
similar challenges. Specifically, these are: problematic constructions of the 
‘community’; isolation from wider development planning structures and processes; 
weak community participation and lack of commitment to transforming power 
relations; and tendency towards highly conservative development visions.  
 
CHALLENGES OF PRIVATE SECTOR ENGAGEMENT IN COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT 
Constructing the ‘community’ 
Critical development scholars have long pointed out that development actors struggle 
to define ‘communities’, given the inherent complexities of geographical and social 
boundaries, multiple memberships and interests, movement and migration, and so 
forth. Weaknesses in identifying and delimiting community can be observed in all of 
our cases. One of the clearest examples comes from South Africa’s government-led 
Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme 
(REIPPPP). Socio-economic and enterprise development are common requirements 
for South Africa’s business environment along the principles of CSR and investment 
as defined by Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment legislation (Hamann, 
2006). However, the REIPPPP is ‘unique for its economic development requirements’ 
(Baker and Wlokas, 2014: 27), with the level of community development required (a 
minimum of 30 percent of the bid value) setting it apart from previous public-private 
partnership arrangements. Its requirement that local communities be incorporated into 
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the shareholding is novel, creating an additional and potentially community-managed 
source of revenue for local development. State contracts with Independent Power 
Producers (IPPs) – largely overseas investors in and developers of wind and solar 
energy – require them to assess socio-economic needs of local communities and state 
their commitments to providing financial resources for health, education and other 
objectives for the lifetime of the project. These contracts define the beneficiary 
‘community’ as any community within a 50km radius of the power project.  
As critics have pointed out, this definition presents a number of problems 
(Baker and Wlokas, 2014; Tait et al., 2013; Wlokas et al., 2012). First, what 
constitutes a community is not defined, but is treated as an arbitrary geographically 
delimited object for development intervention. Second, the areas surrounding projects 
are likely to incorporate several social groupings, in disparate locales and speaking 
different languages, with little cohesion, unity or common identity. Third, the 50km 
radius produces overlapping beneficiary areas, raising questions about who has 
responsibility in these areas and what projects are being formulated. This also has 
potential to cause great confusion in localities where more than one private sector 
company is overseeing community development. For example, in De Aar, a town of 
around 40,000 people in an area of the Northern Cape with limited economic 
development opportunities, seven projects likely to generate significant revenues are 
being developed (Baker and Wlokas, 2014). Fourth, there is inconsistency between 
IPPs in terms of how they are working with ‘communities’: some have included all 
settlements within 50km, while others have chosen to work with just one. In cases 
where the 50km limit includes a large metropolitan area, many IPPs are ignoring these 
in favour of smaller more easily defined and managed ‘communities’. Thus IPPs 
appear to be disinclined ‘to explicitly define the community as a concept or to 
delineate its boundaries’; instead, ‘the community construct is based on a set of 
positive assertions about social values and policies, most of which serve to place the 
company at the heart of the community’ (Jenkins, 2004: 28). Fifth, the 50km radius 
creates artificial boundaries, often dividing municipal areas, towns or villages. 
Finally, some 50km zones are sparsely populated, creating difficulties in meeting 
investment requirements. Working with communities in South Africa has often 
proved difficult for businesses, in part because they have tended to define 
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communities in simplistic terms. There is little to suggest that REIPPPP will work 
more effectively.  
In the context of large-scale mining development in Papua New Guinea, which 
has underpinned the formal economy since independence in 1975 (Banks et al., 2013), 
the ‘community’ is defined through ambiguous and often contentious relationships 
that develop between a mining corporation and surrounding settlements (Bebbington 
et al., 2008). The label often adheres to two distinct but overlapping categories of 
people. The first comprises those identified (in formal surveys) as the ‘owners’ of the 
ground encompassed by the leases of the mining company. These leases are formally 
defined sets of cadastral lines that rarely take notice of geographic features or pre-
existing social boundaries. As 97% of the land area of PNG is under customary 
collective forms of tenure, the delineation of these lease boundaries, and their 
intersections with often loose social boundaries, can generate conflict. For example, 
‘ownership’ of the Mt. Kare prospect in the highlands Enga Province has been highly 
contested for more than 20 years. Once defined, though, the legal ‘landowners’ of a 
particular project tend to become a relatively stable coalition of people with a vested 
interest in preserving their exclusive status that provides access to significant revenue 
flows and other benefits, such as preferential employment (see Jorgensen, 1997). 
The second ‘community’ in relation to mining operations is a broader set of 
people and groups that includes landowners, but also takes in others in surrounding 
areas who are, nominally at least, ‘affected’ by the mine. This may include those from 
the same kin group as the landowners who reside outside the lease boundaries, other 
adjoining communities, those affected by or close to other mine infrastructure (roads, 
powerlines), people with commercial connections to the mine or surrounding 
community (contractors), and downstream communities whose environment is 
affected by mine waste. In many respects the definition of this ‘community’ is 
something of a moveable feast, as processes such as in-migration and changes in mine 
practices (e.g. waste disposal, contracting) can change the make-up of this 
‘community of interest’ (Banks, 2006). In contrast to landowners who have sets of 
negotiated agreements with the mining company and guaranteed revenue streams, this 
second community is less formally linked to the mine. In the PNG context, they can 
pose a variety of risks to the operation – particularly the risk of physical threat to the 
asset (for example, the huge multinational mine on Bougainville Island was forcibly 
16 
 
closed by aggrieved community members in the late 1980s, sparking a civil war, and 
has never reopened). In many respects, then, the definition of this ‘community’ is 
delineated through corporate evaluations of the risks attached to different geographic 
and social groups. 
Similar considerations can be observed in tourist resorts working with 
communities in Fiji. To date the Fijian government has provided generous incentives 
to encourage foreign investments in tourism by large corporations, including 
corporate tax waivers and removal of restrictions on repatriation of profits, in order to 
boost the tourism sector (Scheyvens and Russell 2012). As in the PNG mining 
context, legal lease-related obligations (in this case overseen by the iTaukei Land 
Trust Board, iTLTB) bring certain benefits to customary landowners of the relevant 
mataqali (clan), including lease payments and a stated commitment to preferential 
employment of those from landowner communities. The government has sought since 
2009 to widen the advantages derived from lease deals by requiring corporations to 
assist mataqali in the improvement of their water supply, health provision, village 
infrastructure and electrification (NLTB 2006). A second, broader ‘community’ also 
receiving benefits from the tourism company can be quite arbitrary, however, and is 
dictated more by the resort’s interests than by any sense of (a) which communities 
might have a greater claim on the resort’s resources (for example, because of impacts 
on marine resources over which they can claim customary rights), or (b) those most 
‘in need’ (although there are some attempts by resorts in this regard, for example, to 
support schools in more remote areas which rarely receive tourist donations). It is 
common for resorts to state that they particularly support people in adjacent villages 
even when their only contribution is to offer employment to such people, rather than 
engaging in purposeful initiatives with/within communities. There are exceptions, 
however, with some shark diving companies paying a per head fee from diving trips 
to the local yavusa (tribe) out of respect for using their fishing waters. In these cases, 
tourism businesses are recognising and respecting the cultural rights of the yavusa, 
even though they are not required to do so under current Fijian law. 
It appears then that although there are numerous approaches, corporations (and 
their state partners) face the inherent complexity, contradictions and at times 
impossibility of drawing a clear and meaningful line around beneficiary 
‘communities’. This leads to uneven development interventions and in some cases, 
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associated conflict. This is unsurprising, but calls into question simplistic statements 
accompanying the new boosterism concerning the benefits of corporate-led 
approaches to ‘community development’. 
 
(Mis-)alignment with government planning 
By increasingly representing themselves, or being represented as, agents of 
development, particularly in contexts where governance structures are weak, 
corporations are cast more or less willingly into ‘good citizen’ or even government 
roles. Valente and Crane (2010) suggest four ways in which corporations assume 
what could be constructed as government functions: directly providing social services 
to communities; supporting governments in building governance infrastructure; 
substituting government by providing privatised social services; and stimulating 
alternative models of providing social services. In all cases, communities are seen as 
objects of development rather than agents in their own development.   
Mining companies in PNG typically take on, to varying degrees, all the 
positions noted by Valente and Crane (2010). Indeed one of the biggest tensions faced 
by corporations here is that between providing benefits and services to local 
communities so as to secure a social licence that can mitigate risks to the operation 
and, in the words of frustrated corporate Community Affairs managers, ‘becoming 
government’. The relationships between state, corporation and communities are 
embedded within sets of agreements negotiated prior to the mine being granted 
approval by the state. These agreements formalise commitments to deliver 
infrastructure and services to the community by both the corporation and the state, 
while the community typically agrees not to disrupt the operation of the mine. 
Invariably, though, the party that fails to deliver on its commitments is the state: staff 
are not assigned to agreed positions, important promised social infrastructure is much 
delayed (or never built), and through time a gradual ‘retreat of the state’ can be 
observed at these locations. In one case, direct community action against the resource 
developer (powerlines were felled) was accompanied by a note of apology to the 
company, stating that this form of protest seemed to be the only way to attract the 
attention of the state by communities that felt ‘abandoned’. The corporate response to 
this increasing governance void has typically been the reluctant (‘we don’t want to be 
the government’) taking up of a number of roles, sometimes as a ‘partner’ that seeks 
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to build local capacity, but also often as the direct implementer. In another instance a 
developer took responsibility for drafting two successive 5-year District Plan 
documents for the under-resourced and almost zero-capacity local-level government. 
The context is quite different in the case of South Africa’s REIPPPP, in that 
regional planning and development is the remit of existing government institutions 
and programmes. However, the scheme’s community development element has little 
or no alignment with existing governance institutions in determining or providing 
local or regional development needs. The roles and responsibilities for local 
government differ from project to project and further complications emerge from 
overlapping beneficiary areas. Developers are not required to align with local and 
national development goals and priorities, and the private sector still retains overall 
control over how socio-economic and enterprise development revenues are spent. 
There is no regional oversight of projects to ensure efficient spending. Evidence 
suggests that developers initially focus on high profile smaller projects to build ‘brand 
image’ and promote acceptance, but this risks ‘neglecting strategies to unlock the 
longer-term economic potential of local areas’ (Tait et al., 2013: 21) and may not 
align with priorities of local stakeholders. A further concern is that targeting spending 
at extremely localized levels may not be appropriate or efficient because it cannot be 
done equitably by region or nationally, nor can it be directed at areas in greatest need. 
REIPPPP projects are clustered around optimal resources and where land is available. 
Most solar projects are in the Northern Cape, with a population of just over one 
million, and most wind projects are located along the southern coastal regions of the 
Western and Eastern Cape, while more densely populated and impoverished eastern 
provinces have relatively few projects. There is thus a strong possibility that REIPPPP 
will repeat the trend seen in CSR and CCD initiatives elsewhere of creating ‘islands 
of development’ around corporate sites in a larger sea of underdevelopment (Kapelus, 
2002: 292).  
In the case of Fiji, while many CCD efforts can be seen as reactive, ad hoc 
responses to requests, there are also cases in which tourist resorts seek to support 
longer term development plans of the government. For example, resorts along the 
popular Coral Coast area of Viti Levu contributed F$300,000 (both from guest 
donations and their own funds) towards building a new emergency department at 
Sigatoka hospital, supporting the health ministry in achieving its infrastructure goals. 
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This was the result of eight years of planning, carried out in conjunction with health 
ministry and Sigatoka hospital staff.  Self-interest will often influence which 
development projects resorts choose to support (tourists also benefit from the 
hospital’s emergency department, for example), however in the past these resorts have 
supported initiatives that are likely to benefit the local population alone, including a 
dental clinic and a new eye unit at the hospital. This example reveals the possibility of 
dialogue and coordination between CCD initiatives, state institutions and wider 
development strategies. Overall, though, the picture from across our cases suggests 
weak ties, awareness or enrolment with government planning and priorities.  
 
Representation, participation and transforming power relations 
As discussed previously, corporations, like other actors, struggle to define the 
beneficiary ‘community’, which has implications for representation, participation of 
particular individuals and groups, and raises questions about transforming power 
relations. In Fiji, official community engagement by tourist resort managers with 
landowners occurs via the chief of the landowning unit, via a landowner member of 
the Board of Directors of the resort (sometimes this position is a requirement of the 
lease), or via landowners’ representatives (the iTLTB requires every medium-scale 
hotel on native land to have a representative among their employees, while in large-
scale hotels several employees sit on a landowners’ committee). The landowner 
representatives or member of the Board of Directors communicate concerns from 
either party to the other. This can at times prevent conflict. However, chiefs and other 
members of landowning units have in a number of cases expressed a desire to have a 
stronger direct relationship with the owner or managing director of a resort, rather 
than going through an intermediary. They express displeasure if the general manager 
of an adjacent resort does consult with them through personal visits to their village. 
There seems to be particular concern when a landowner representative is relatively 
young and does not have the culturally-embedded authority to speak on behalf of his 
or her people, and a conflict of interest could occur because this person is 
simultaneously an advocate for the landowning unit and an employee of the resort. 
In the Fijian cultural context it is desirable for corporate ‘chiefs’ (General 
Managers - GMs) to meet regularly with traditional chiefs, and traditional chiefs 
express displeasure if a representative is sent on behalf of the GM.  However, even 
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when GMs do meet directly with chiefs this does not necessarily mean that diversity 
within communities is adequately represented. Rather, representation of the concerns 
of women, lower status groups or those otherwise marginalised can simply be ignored 
– a common limit to ‘participation’ in community development initiatives (Cooke and 
Kothari, 2001).  
The terms of engagement with communities are generally stacked in the 
interests of tourist businesses. For example, while lease agreements dictate 
preferential employment of those from the landowning unit, some resort managers fail 
to abide by this because many mataqali members seeking work are considered 
unqualified, over-aged, or not presenting the ‘right image’. In some cases, only 10% 
of employees are from the landowning unit. In addition, where there is a dispute 
between a resort and nearby communities over an issue such as pollution of 
waterways or lack of compensation for use of fishing grounds, the resort management 
has been known to cancel cultural groups from that community who had previously 
been paid to perform for tourists. This is one way that dissenting voices are silenced.  
Problems are likely to emerge in South Africa’s REIPPPP because the process 
of community development relies on a passive beneficiary model. Community 
engagement has been poor throughout the bidding process and early stages of project 
development (Tait et al., 2013), which has not enabled positive relationships with 
communities. There is little accountability regarding the benefits to communities: the 
only legislative requirement is that appropriate sums of money (1-1.5% of revenues as 
defined by the procurement contracts) are spent on ‘community development’ once 
the project begins to generate revenues. Experience in South Africa and elsewhere 
suggests that top-down project implementation is unlikely to solve local problems, yet 
private investors/developers have not undertaken participatory community needs 
assessments and development planning (ibid.). Participation is not a requirement and 
community voices are not well-represented in policy formulation and negotiations. 
Significantly, inadequate energy provision is a key community need in many rural 
areas, including those in which renewable energy projects are being sited.
3
 There is 
thus plenty of potential for ill-feeling in communities located next to large-scale 
                                                          
3
 See, for example, 
http://www.oneworldgroup.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1258:acc
ess-to-clean-energy-for-improved-rural-livelihoods &catid=207:low-carbon-development 
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energy generation projects because their energy needs are unlikely to be factored into 
community development. More generally, there are questions as to whether the 
private sector is the right stakeholder to be charged with delivering community 
development processes in South Africa, where transforming local power relationships 
and inclusion of historically disadvantaged people in the economy are both complex 
and highly politicised. Moreover, the community development component of the 
REIPPPP cannot disguise the fact that most of the projects are built on commercial 
farmland and large landowners are benefiting significantly by receiving the majority 
of the lease payments for solar and wind projects (around 2% of the total return). 
Even in a context where the state and governance structures are strong, 
community development has still proved challenging in South Africa. For example, 
community trusts are employed to manage funds in the REIPPPP: these govern assets 
on behalf of the defined beneficiary group and are a common choice of legal vehicle 
for community development in South Africa. The community shareholding is 
allocated to the trust, which is tasked with managing the dividends. The trusts are 
governed by a board of trustees, which can include representatives from the IPP, 
financial institutions, professional trustees, legal professionals, and representatives of 
beneficiary communities. Trusts are acknowledged by government, IPPs and 
development practitioners as ‘exclusive rather than inclusive, difficult to manage 
operationally and introducing many challenges to representing communities and local 
politics’ (Tait et al., 2013: 18). Despite this, the REIPPPP has not identified an 
alternative. The fact that developers are appointing trustees because elections are not 
feasible across large and complex beneficiary areas, and that these are often ward 
councillors who are already political appointees, has potential to generate mistrust: in 
other sectors, embroiling private sector development in local politics has led to 
violence within communities (Tshikululu, 2010). Problems are also apparent within 
long-term community-governed structures, including high staff turn-over and 
inadequate capacity and skills (Tait et al., 2013). There are thus significant challenges 
for IPPs in engaging with communities. 
As a consequence of similar challenges in Papua New Guinea, an absolute 
refusal to engage with complex questions concerning ‘culture’ or ‘politics’ at the local 
level marks the corporate stance here. Thus, extreme and structurally embedded 
gender disparities apparent across PNG society that continually marginalise women 
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(World Bank, 2012), are reflected by landowner representation and formal landowner 
associations in the mining sector. Initial negotiations at Porgera, for example, were 
carried out by 23 clan representatives, of whom only one was a woman. The rationale 
provided (and never effectively challenged by the companies) is that local ‘culture’ 
disallows women from representing their communities. It is telling that after 25 years, 
recent negotiations at one mining operation (Ok Tedi) have provided for only a small 
portion (between 10 and 18 per cent) of community compensation to be ‘ring-fenced’ 
for women and women’s projects. Perhaps even more revealing was that this outcome 
was touted by a World Bank review team as an industry-leading practice (Menzies 
and Harley, 2012). Gender is not the only axis of exclusion that becomes further 
entrenched by the activities of the private sector in PNG, but it is in many respects the 
one that companies could do most to challenge. However, it is not in the interests of 
corporate agendas to engage with, let alone challenge, local politics, interests and 
cultural mores in these communities. This is especially the case where immanent 
processes of change driven by the mine add additional layers of complexity and social 
dislocation to these politically-charged local social environments (see Banks 2006). In 
these contexts, corporate interests align strongly with vested interests in communities, 
and provide an impetus to support more socially conservative initiatives, agendas and 
interests. 
 
Conservative development visions 
Our observations suggest that CCD is very often highly conservative in its goals. This 
appears to be the case particularly in the context of extractive industries. Banks et al. 
(2013) suggest that the social processes and transformations generated by the modern 
benefits of, for example, mining (jobs, revenue streams and so forth) also open ‘social 
risks’ to the mining operation, which then require the company to direct resources 
towards community development. In the case of Papua New Guinea, the latter are 
often used to prop up traditional institutions within communities to ensure continued 
support for the mining operations. They include providing support for law and order 
initiatives and governance, as well as resources for those concerns most damaged or 
marginalised by the mining operation, such as health, women’s groups and cultural 
heritage. Here then is a clear case discussed earlier in the paper of a Polanyian ‘double 
movement’ of intentional development mitigating the egregious consequences of 
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immanent development, in which the development responses are conservative forms 
of social technology and paternalistic forms of trusteeship that remain wilfully 
detached from political processes within communities.  
South Africa’s REIPPPP process is designed to act as a driver for the private 
sector to foster socio-economic development within historically disadvantaged 
communities (Tait, 2011). It is too early to assess potential developmental outcomes 
for ‘communities’, but recent history suggests the signs are not particularly promising. 
Businesses working with communities in South Africa have often failed to recognise 
conflicting interests or to work with regional planning structures, and have prioritised 
meeting the needs of local elites rather than ensuring inclusive decision-making over 
choice and acceptance of projects (Ponte et al., 2007; Mbeke, 2009). Working through 
community trusts is unlikely to change this and REIPPPP is unlikely to deliver 
meaningful and inclusive change unless there is deeper engagement with beneficiary 
communities (Wlokas et al., 2012). As discussed, evidence suggests that developers 
are initially focusing on smaller projects to build ‘brand image’ and promote 
acceptance (Tait et al., 2013), but building sports centres and community halls will do 
little to address the deeper structural problems within local communities. The 
probability of highly uneven development and of community development not 
meeting basic needs such as energy provision are also potential risks to the IPPs, 
which could generate highly conservative forms of community engagement in order 
to mitigate these risks.  
Similarly, it is clear that the vast majority of CCD activities by tourism 
corporations in Fiji adopt a conservative approach to community development: the 
emphasis is on health, education, employment, law and justice, rather than on 
transforming power relations. These conservative approaches often reflect self-
interest. Security is very important to resorts, with their often ostentatious shows of 
wealth in areas where their indigenous neighbours struggle to meet more basic needs. 
Thus it is not surprising to find examples of resorts funding a new police post in their 
vicinity, or resourcing a youth diversion programme run by local police. Their clients 
want to feel they are in a safe paradise, and police work can reduce crime rates in the 
area. Likewise, law and order is a perpetual corporate focus in Papua New Guinea’s 
mining sector, particular in those areas (mostly the highlands) where community level 
violence and tribal fighting is still widespread. A major initiative at the Barrick 
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corporation’s Porgera operation – ‘Restoring Justice’ – is concerned to build up both 
community-level capacity, and understanding of and support for, the formal state 
institutions of law and order, including the provision of infrastructure and training to 
the police force (Barrick, 2011). Similar previous corporate initiatives at Porgera, 
although less community-led, have ironically resulted in the heightening of corporate 
risk: support for a short-lived police ‘Rapid Deployment Unit’ in the early 1990s was 
curtailed after a riot at the mine accommodation facilities sparked by the shooting of a 
local youth by drunken Unit officers (Banks, 2000). Again, this points to the often 
unstable connection between corporate risk aversion and community development.  
For a variety of reasons then, CCD appears to be at best oriented towards a 
liberal model of incremental improvement in ‘safe’ areas of intervention – health, 
mainstream education, leisure facilities and so on. Policing and programmes to reduce 
violence are primarily driven by the corporations’ needs, rather than those of local 
human security. In none of our examples did we find corporations working with or 
even talking about more transformational changes – that is, initiatives building local 
agency and transforming power relations with the aim of bottom-up agenda setting.  
 
CONCLUSIONS  
The private sector is increasingly being placed centre-stage in official development 
rhetoric. Following the failure of NGOs to provide a panacea for the problems and 
challenges of community development, there is a danger that the private sector is 
being treated as the next ‘magic bullet’, with the assumption that community 
development can benefit from the purported attributes of the private sector – that it is 
innovative, streamlined, free from bureaucracy, efficient, and so on. The reality is that 
enrolling the private sector for development (di Bella et al., 2013), or creating 
conditions favourable to corporations (re)presenting themselves as development 
agents (Blowfield and Dolan, 2014), often fails to account for the complex tasks 
private sector corporations confront as agents of intentional development. Much faith 
is being invested in the private sector to deliver development, but corporations face 
many of the same complex and sometimes intractable problems confronting state 
actors, NGOs and donors. As our examples suggest, when it comes to the specific 
realm of ‘community development’, they are often ineffective and struggle to 
overcome many of the difficulties they face.  
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This paper has drawn attention to four specific challenges and problems that 
appear across the different kinds of private sector-led development in diverse contexts 
and sectors. Defining a beneficiary ‘community’ is as fraught for the private sector as 
it has been for states, NGOs and donors. This can be arbitrary, divisive and a source 
of conflict within and between communities, and it also brings risks for private sector 
corporations. Meanwhile there is often a worrying lack of alignment between many 
private sector initiatives and the policies and priorities of the state. This is the case in 
South Africa, where the state is relatively strong, and in Fiji where the state has been 
active in creating favourable investment conditions while attempting to guarantee the 
inclusion of local communities. In the case of Papua New Guinea the concern is even 
deeper, with mining companies taking over the role of the state in some instances 
where local level governments are under-resourced. In many examples of corporate 
community development there is clearly a lack of active participation or control by 
community members, who are positioned as passive beneficiaries of corporate 
largesse. This lack of agency and capacity as well as failure to transform power 
relations within communities is of concern in all three of our examples. Finally, we 
raise concerns about the conservative nature of the community development 
initiatives across our examples. Engaging in community development brings a variety 
of risks for the private sector, including the physical risk to the asset (mines, solar 
parks, resorts), social risks brought about by the nature of private sector activities, and 
reputational risk if CCD cannot be shown to be effective. In mitigating these risks, 
corporations often pursue conservative development agendas. Unsurprisingly, just 
development and transforming power relations are not evident in these agendas; 
rather, there is often a narrow focus on health, education, employment and security. 
In drawing out these commonalities we are not suggesting that there are no 
differences in the nature and effectiveness of CCD in different places or sectors, or 
that all corporations behave similarly. The tourism sector, for example, demonstrates 
that where companies are smaller, have invested significant capital and are in a place 
for the medium to long term their engagement with community development may be 
more positive (as we suggest, there is some evidence of this in Fiji). And, of course, 
tourism businesses differ from the extractive and resource sectors because they need 
local endorsement in providing a welcoming face to visitors, which means that these 
companies often have a greater commitment to demonstrable community 
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development. However, whatever the level of engagement with local communities, 
the problem remains that corporations often lack the commitment and skills required 
to deliver effective development assistance: ‘since delivering development is not a 
primary motive for companies to engage in social initiatives, the business case 
frequently leads to the failure of projects’ (Frynas, 2005). 
 CCD is just one form of corporate engagement with development actors and 
processes. Broader developmental processes such as the adoption of the Sustainable 
Development Goals, enhanced donor partnering with the private sector, and the 
outcomes of the on-going negotiations around climate change (e.g. the December 
2015 Conference of Parties in Paris) will all shape the private sector’s entanglement 
in development in a variety of fundamental ways. However, CCD represents the most 
direct way in which the private sector shapes local development outcomes and we 
argue that unless corporations are able to effectively address the elements of the 
critique outlined above, the outcomes of their engagements will continue to generate 
partial outcomes, frustration, and conflict at the local level. While the picture is 
complicated, even the limited range of examples we have discussed suggests that it is 
difficult to envisage an increased role for the private sector in community 
development having anything but a depoliticising effect.  
 The landscape of international development is shifting to radically (re-)centre 
the private sector as the engine of development. In many cases, CCD is likely to 
remain a conservative form of intentional development in response to the social, 
economic and/or environmental chaos wrought by immanent development 
perpetuated by corporations in impoverished communities. Thus, while new financial 
and policy mechanisms are being created to enrol or facilitate private sector-led 
‘community development’, this is unlikely to be any more effective than previous 
attempts at resolving the structural problems affecting these communities. Given that 
community development is unlikely to ever be the core concern of private sector 
corporations, for whom the bottom-line remains profit-making, it would be folly to 
expect anything else. While corporations are accountable to their shareholders, it is 
unclear who holds them accountable when they engage in CCD. Corporations are 
certainly not expected to abide by the same principles of development effectiveness, 
for example, imposed by the OECD on donors. Even where lease agreements or 
procurement contracts are demanded by states, these merely dictate either the type or 
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level of investment into communities, rather than demand accountability for its 
effectiveness. Consequently, questions will still need to be asked about the level of 
community involvement in determining and planning development projects, their 
sense of ownership of processes and outcomes, their responses to unintended 
outcomes of projects (positive or negative), and the level of empowerment, inclusion 
and capacity-building, which decades of experience by states, NGOs and donors 
suggest must be to the foreground of any meaningful ‘community development’. 
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